What does culture do to corporate governance?: cultural influence in the corporate governance of organisations by Morrison, Ana.
ANA MORRISON 
WHAT DOES CULTURE DO TO CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE?-CULTURALINFLUENCEIN 
THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF 
ORGANISATIONS 
LLM RESEARCH PAPER 
LAWS526 - CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
FACULTY OF LAW 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
2005 
CONTENTS 
u11v'HS'• ufON 
ABSTRACT 
I INTRODUCTION 
7c w,, 
ore Upt' 
~ 
L y 
A Corporate Governance Under the Spotlight 
1. The global phenomenon 
2. Corporate governance defined 
B Fundamental Principles 
II THE 'CULTURE MATTERS' PHENOMENON 
A. Culture Defined 
B. The Interface Between Law and Culture 
C. International Research 
D. The Relevance of Culture in the New Zealand Context 
II WHAT DOES CULTURE DO TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE? -
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
A Introduction 
B Ownership and Control 
1. Cultural influence by formal means 
2. Cultural influence by informal means 
2 
C Transparency 
1. Independence 
2. Disclosure and reporting 
3. Asset protection 
D Accountability 
1. Financial accountability 
2. Enforcement of rights 
IV LESSONS FOR NEW ZEALAND 
A Culture Does Matter 
B Lessons for New Zealand 
V CONCLUSION 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
APPENDIX 1: THE OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
3 
ABSTRACT 
Global interest in corporate governance has grown considerably over the 
past decade, particularly in the wake of high profile corporate collapses. 
Following international trends, the discourse on corporate governance in New 
Zealand has gained significant momentum. In this environment the credibility of 
the governance of Maori and iwi organisations has been subject to escalating 
interest. 
The aim of this paper is to explore how culture affects the corporate 
governance of organisations. It investigates the interface between culture and 
corporate governance and demonstrates the ways in which culture is incorporated 
in, and influences the governance processes of, organisations. 
I argue that, as in similar experiences internationally, culture is relevant 
to both the development of governance structures and in the practical 
implementation of governance processes. To demonstrate this I utilise 
international case studies and the Maori Fisheries Act 2004 to analyse governance 
processes that are subject to divergent cultural influence. 
My findings support the established view that culture is important in the 
development of an organisation's governance systems and processes and 
particularly for Maori and iwi organisations, significant for the implementation of 
culturally attuned corporate governance practices. 
Statement on word length: The text of this paper ( excluding title page, table of 
contents, footnotes, bibliography, and appendices) comprises approximately 
12,667 words. 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
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I INTRODUCTION 
A Corporate Governance Under the Spotlight 
1. The global phenomenon 
Corporate governance has been under the spotlight recently following 
dramatic and widely publicised collapses of major multi-national corporations 
such as Enron, WorldCom and in Australia, HIH. These corporate failures, which 
resulted in investors losing billions, sent shockwaves through the global markets 
bringing the debate on the importance of effective corporate governance to the 
fore. 1 New Zealand has not escaped the resulting international focus on financial 
reporting and corporate governance and like other jurisdictions has also heeded 
the call for the imposition of new internationally recognised standards.
2 In 
response to these developments other countries have implemented a variety of 
mechanisms such as corporate governance codes as well as principles and 
guidelines. In order to maintain its credibility in the international market,3 New 
Zealand has adopted corporate governance reforms through the Securities 
Commission's ("Commission") Corporate Governance in New Zealand -
Principles and Guidelines, and the New Zealand Exchange Corporate Governance 
Best Practice Code. These standard setting initiatives are aimed at facilitating the 
development and expression of corporate governance principles and practices that 
suit local circumstances.4 
2. Corporate governance defined 
The term corporate governance does not have a universally accepted 
definition and numerous perspectives of what it means and how it is implemented 
exist. The 'management approach' to governance is concerned primarily with the 
1 Pat Barrett "Achieving Better Practice Corporate Governance In The Public Sector" (Keynote 
Address, CPA Australia's Government Business Symposium, Melbourne, 26 June 2002) sourced 
from <http: //www.anao.gov.au> (last accessed 30 September 2005). 
2 Jane Dip lock "New Regulatory Compliance Procedures for New Zealand" (Speech at the Twelfth 
One Stop Update for the Accountant in Business, Wellington, 15 October 2002); Cave, below n 3. 
3 Shelley Cave "A New Era in Corporate Governance" (2003) 50(3) New Zealand Management 
13 . 
4 Diplock, below n 12, 3; Michael Bos "Defining Corporate Governance" (2005) 13 NZ Lawyer 
14. 
5 
strategic leadership of an organisation,5 where the 'ownership and control' 
approach mainly focuses on power relations and the division of wealth.
6 
On the 
other hand, the narrower view of corporate governance confines the notion to a 
strictly 'legal systems approach'. This approach conceptualises corporate 
governance structures as limited to the legal mechanisms that influence and 
control decisions and actions. 7 With such a vast array of differing interpretations 
it is not surprising that the debate continues about the issue of defining the role, 
scope and meaning of corporate governance. Notwithstanding these various 
approaches, corporate governance is generally understood to encompass how an 
organisation is managed, its corporate structures, culture, policies and strategies 
and the ways in which it deals with its various stakeholders. 8 
Corporate governance can be most succinctly referred to as "the act of 
steering societies and organisations" . 9 Governance rules, guidelines and 
prescriptions have even been suggested as an attempt to actually align the drivers 
of corporate behaviour with the outcomes that society expects. 10 Developing this 
concept, corporate governance can begin to be understood as being a part of the 
larger issue of how to organise economic activity in order to promote and achieve 
the more fundamental societal objectives relating to equity, fairness , freedom and 
responsibilities of the citizen. 11 The Commission defines corporate governance as 
5 The New Zealand Business Council for Sustainable Development and Westpac New Zealand 
Let's Settle This - Through Settlement to Sustainable Maori Enterprise (New Zealand Business 
Council for Sustainable Development and Westpac New Zealand, Auckland, 2005) 46. 
6 Amir N Licht, Chanan Goldschmidt and Shalom H Schwartz "Culture, Law, and Finance : 
Cultural Dimensions of Corporate Governance Laws" (Paper presented at Law and Economics 
Workshop, University of California, Berkley, 28 January 2002) 
<http://repositories.cdlib.org/berkeley _ law_ econ> (last accessed I October 2005); Gregory 
Jackson "Sociological Perspectives" in Parkinson, John, Andrew Gamble and Gavin Kelly (eds) 
The Political Economy of the Company (Hart Publishing, Portland, 2000) 266. 
7 Amir N Licht "The Mother of All Path Dependencies: Towards a Cross-Cultural Theory of 
Corporate Governance Systems" (2001) 26 Delaware J Corp L 147. 
8 Barrett, above n I ; Nick Bradley "How to Measure and Analyze Corporate Governance" in 
international Financial Law Review Corporate Governance 2003 (LFLR, London, 2003) 40. 
9 Russell Taylor "Indigenous Capacity Building and the Relationship to Sound Governance and 
Leadership" (Australian Indigenous Leadership Centre National Native Title Conference, Alice 
Springs, 3-5 June 2003) <http ://wwwaiatis.gov.au> (last accessed 9 September 2005) 9. 
1° Cave, above n 3, 16. 
11 R P Austin "What is Corporate Governance? Precepts and Legal Principles" (Paper for Legal 
Research Foundation Corporate Governance at the Crossroads Seminar, Auckland, 18 February 
2005) 2; Materna Dodd "Nation Building and Maori Development - The Importance of 
Governance" (Paper presented at the yct Biennial Conference of the international Development 
Studies Network of Aotearoa/New Zealand, Palmerston North, 5-7 December 2002); Tabalujan, 
above n 53 , l 70 ; Gregory Jackson "Sociological Perspectives" in Parkinson, John, Andrew 
6 
the set of structures and behaviours by which a company or other entity is directed 
and managed. 12 The Commission intends these structures and behaviours to guide 
how objectives are set, strategies and plans are developed, how performance is 
monitored and reported on and how the risks faced by an entity are identified and 
managed. 13 The New Zealand government also has a view on what corporate 
governance means in the New Zealand context. The New Zealand Treasury 
considers that: 14 
Governance concerns the ways in which groups of individuals 
arrange their collective efforts and resources in order to 
accomplish their objectives. It involves methods for determining 
how power is exercised, how decisions are made and how 
stakeholders have their say. 
These several examples illustrate var10us interpretations of what 
corporate governance can mean and how it may be understood depending on the 
organisation, its role and it operating context. The essence of corporate 
governance is about how power is exercised and how decisions are taken. 
Corporate governance systems and processes can therefore be understood as the 
mechanisms that balance the various corporate relationships described above, thus 
regulating the rights and obligations arising from the exercise of those decision-
making powers and functions. 
B Fundamental Principles 
Utilising case studies, this paper presents a comparative analysis of how 
the expression of corporate governance processes are informed by relevant 
cultural characteristics. The analysis will be based on fundamental principles 
drawn from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
Principles of Corporate Governance ("OECD Principles"). 15 
Gamble and Gavin Kelly (eds) The Political Economy of the Company (Hart Publishing, Portland, 
2000) 265. 
12 Jane Diplock "Corporate Governance - Principles and Public Policy" (Address to School of 
Government, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, 3 November 2003) 3. 
13 Diplock, above n 12. 
14 John Whitehead and Barbara Annesley The Context for Maori Economic Development -
Background Paper for Hui Taumata 2005 (The Treasury, Wellington, 2005) 22. 
15 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Principles of Corporate Governance 
(OECD, France, 2004) 4. 
The OECD Principles are a set of non-binding principles intended to 
assist governments in the evaluation and improvement of the legal, institutional 
and regulatory frameworks for corporate governance. 
16 The OECD Principles 
were developed in 1999 by the OECD Ad Hoe Task Force on Corporate 
Governance and subsequently amended in 2004 to take into account international 
developments in corporate governance. 17 These principles are viewed as a way to 
promote fundamental governance standards that the OECD believe can be broadly 
applied to reflect the social, economic, legal and cultural circumstances of each 
country. 18 The OECD Principles are seen as the benchmark upon which other 
good governance statements or guidelines can be based. The OECD Principles 
(listed in full at Appendix 1) have been grouped by the OECD into the main 
themes of; ensuring effective corporate governance framework, shareholder rights 
and ownership functions, equitable treatment of shareholders, stakeholders' roles, 
disclosure and transparency, and board responsibilities. 19 
The Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance 1s concerned with 
ensuring that the firm is run in the interests of the shareholders. This shareholder-
centric model is characterised by dispersed ownership, strong legal protection for 
shareholders and indifference to other stakeholders. However, not all corporate 
governance systems subscribe to this view. Others, such as Germany and Europe 
and the Asian countries discussed in Part III of this paper subscribe to a more 
stakeholder-focussed governance model. This in turn affects the corporate 
governance systems and processes of their organisations. Accordingly, there is 
not one common model that can apply universally to different organisations in 
different countries. Instead, it is widely accepted that there are common 
principles that form the basis of all governance models. These principles are often 
regarded as vital for building robust and effective governance systems for 
organisations. It is accepted that good governance requires strong mechanisms to 
promote accountability, transparent flow of information and separation of 
governance control from management functions. 20 Applying this proposition to 
the OECD Principles, these too can be further distilled to fit within the good 
16 Licht, above n 7. 
17 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development above n 15 . 
18 ' Licht, above n 7. 
19 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development above n 15 14. 
20 ' ' Jones, below n 63 ; TOKM, below n 167; Healey, below n 107. 
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governance principles stated above. For the purposes of this paper these 
fundamental principles have been more generically stated as being Ownership and 
Control, Transparency and Accountability. Ownership and Control encompasses 
owners rights, rights of the shareholder and ownership structures, political power, 
encouraging participation and representation and control. Transparency covers 
disclosure and reporting, self dealing, conflicts of interest and insider trading. 
Accountability includes governor's responsibilities, reporting, self-regulation and 
enforcement. These principles are consistently understood within Anglo-Saxon 
countries as being the core elements of good corporate governance and provide a 
broad and inclusive framework upon which the comparative analysis in this paper 
is based.21 These principles also form the basis of the Maori Fisheries Act 2004 
("MFA") which is discussed later in this paper.22 
2 1 Jones, below n 63; TOKM, below n 167; Healey, below n 107. 
22 See discussion in Part II B. 
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II THE 'CULTURE MATTERS' PHENOMENON 
A. 'Culture' Defined 
Culture is an amorphous concept. Cornell and Kalt ( 1988) consider that 
culture is best conceived as a set of interpretations, understandings, and models of 
action that provide strategic guidance.23 Culture has also been referred to as "a 
repertoire of socially transmitted and intra-generationally generated ideas about 
how to live and make judgments, both in general terms and in regard to specific 
domains of life".24 The Oxford Dictionary defines culture as the distinctive 
customs, achievements and outlook of a society or group.25 Although definitions 
vary, what is consistent in the differing articulations of culture, is that culture is 
essentially about values. Mead (2003) states that values _relate to principles or 
standards of behaviour.26 These cultural values represent the implicitly or 
explicitly shared ideas about what is normal, good, right and desirable in a society 
or cultural group.27 They are the basis of the specific norms that tell people what 
is appropriate in various situations. In doing so, cultural values, shape social and 
other interactions.28 Values are not only shaped by people's understandings of 
them, but can change in response to external influences.29 Culture therefore 
encompasses social practices, customs, and values. Because of its broad 
application across and relevance to the social spectrum, culture underlies many 
social and legal phenomena.30 
23 
Stephen Cornell and Joseph P Kalt "Public Choice, Culture and American Indian Economic 
Development" (Weiner Centre for Public Policy, John F Kennedy School of Government, Harvard 
University, 1988) 23. 
24 
Orlando Patterson "Taking Culture Seriously: A Framework and an Afro-American Illustration" 
in Lawrence E Harrison and Samuel P Huntington (eds) Culture Matters - How Values Shape 
Human Progress (Basic Books, New York, 2000) 208. 
25 
Oxford University Press Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (5 th ed, OUP, Oxford, 2002). 
:: Hirini M Mead Tikanga Maori - living by Maori Values (Huia, Wellington, 2003) 27. 
Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz, above n 6; Gorga, below n 35 , 60. 
28 
Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz, above n 6; Gorga, below n 35, 60. 
29 
Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz, above n 6, 83; Lawrence E Harrison and Samuel P 
Huntington (eds) Culture Matters - How Values Shape Human Progress (Basic Books, New York, 
2000) 123 xxviii; Francis, below n 36. 
30 
Michael C Jensen "Value Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective 
Function" in Chew, Donald H (Junior) and Stuart L Gillan (eds) Corporate Governance at the 
Cross Roads (McGraw-Hill Irwin, New York, 2005); Gorga, below n 35, 60; Shen, below n 127, 
22. 
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In the Maori context, tikanga is the term given to the customs, practices 
and rules that regulate the behaviour of Maori people.31 It is the practical 
application of tikanga that is judged, evaluated and understood in terms of 
values.32 Mead (2003) refers to these values as tools of thought and 
understanding that help organise behaviour and provide templates and 
frameworks to guide actions. However, this paper does not constrain the meaning 
of culture to a narrow interpretation of 'indigenous culture'. Because culture is 
founded on the notion of values, 'culture' can validly apply to any fora and any 
groupmg. Furthermore, because values are not a fixed set of rules, rather a 
developing set of principles, culture can adapt to new situations by applying 
common principles (or values) to any situation. This is observed in the diverse 
application of the term 'culture', such as for example, its use in the concept of 
'corporate culture', meaning the shared values, beliefs and assumptions that drive 
the behavioural norms in an organisation. 
33 
In order to provide clarity of meaning, culture is understood, in the 
analysis undertaken in this paper, as the socially informed and transmitted ideas 
and values of a specific cultural group as informed by that group's customs, 
traditions and heritage. 
B. The Interface Behveen Law and Culture 
Culture is not an independent variable. It plays an important and 
developmentally defining role in legal culture.
34 Because law and culture 
mutually inform and reinforce each other, the extent to which one influences the 
other varies depending on the conditions of the culture in which the relevant law 
is embedded.35 Accordingly, there is a wide range of cultural variability in law 
both within and between culturally divergent countries.
36 It is the expression of 
31 Mead, above n 26; Temara, below n 76 . 
32 Mead, above n 26 . 
33 Eric Van den Steen "On the Origin of Shared Beliefs and Corporate Culture" (MIT Sloan 
Research Paper No. 4553.05, 26 August 2005) sourced from 
http: //www.ssrn.com/abstract=793 884. 
34 Lawrence M Friedman The Legal System: A Social Science Perspective (Russell Sage 
Foundation, New York, 1975) 76 . 
35 Gorga, Erica Cristina Rocha "Does Culture Matter for Corporate Governance? A Case Study of 
Brazil" (John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper Series, Stanford University, 
Stanford, 2003) 22 (sourced from http ://ssrn .com/abstract=4 l 070 I). 
36 Cardinal George Francis (O.M.I) "Law and Culture" (2003) I Ave Maria L Rev 1, 3. 
11 
this variability that can be seen in the implementation of legal institutions such as 
corporate governance systems. 
Legislative examples of this interaction between law and culture is 
readily seen in the New Zealand context; within the MFA which contains 
culturally appropriate mechanisms to deal with membership determination, the 
disposal of collectively owned assets and dispute resolution based on tikanga 
Maori.37 The Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 also contains culturally attuned 
legal mechanisms that reflect traditional ownership concepts.38 Other examples of 
the inclusion of cultural characteristics within legislation are the Education Act 
1989 (regarding the definition of wananga) and the Resource Management Act 
1991 (regarding water use and protection of culturally sensitive information). 
The MF A is the enacting legislation of the · final allocation and 
distribution model of the Treaty of Waitangi ("Treaty") commercial fisheries 
settlement that was established by the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries) Settlement 
Act 1992. The settlement extinguished Maori customary rights to commercial 
fishing in exchange for certain property rights . The assets provided under the 
settlement are a proxy for the customary rights that were extinguished. 
Accordingly, it was seen as necessary to ensure that these culturally important 
assets could not be disposed of without the approval of iwi members or alienated 
from Maori ownership. The Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission 
("TOKM") was established to develop a model of allocation that addressed the 
distribution of the settlement assets and that took into account the special nature 
of the assets (being originally customary rights-based). The principles upon 
which the fisheries settlement allocation model is based are durability, 
compromise, fairness, allocation to iwi, intergenerational obligations and that the 
settlement ultimately be for the benefit of all Maori.39 Analysis of Schedule 7 of 
the MFA identifies representation,40 disclosure,4 1 membership,42 accountability,43 
37 
Maori Fisheries Act 2004, 7111 sch, kaupapa 6(l)(a) and 6(2). 
38 Maori Fisheries Act 2004, Parts 7 and 9. 
39 
Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission "Supplementary Report by the Treaty of Waitangi 
Fisheries Commission to the Foreshore and Other Sea-related Legislation Select Committee on the 
Maori Fisheries Bill 2003" (MF6JD) 2. 
40 
Maori Fisheries Act 2004, 7th sch, kaupapa I and 2, 
4 1 Maori Fisheries Act 2004, 7t1, sch, kaupapa 4. 
42 
Maori Fisheries Act 2004, 7th sch, kaupapa 5 and 6. 
43 
Maori Fisheries Act 2004, 7th sch, kaupapa 7 and 8. 
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and separation of ownership and control,
44 as the principles integral to the 
governance of iwi organisations under the MF A. These principles align closely 
with the three fundamental principles of Ownership and Control, Transparency 
and Accountability previously discussed in Part I B. 
The fisheries settlement model and the resulting legislation (the MF A) 
reflects Anglo-Saxon corporate governance ideals of performance in its design 
while also containing other important provision that reflect the underlying 
principles of the allocation model. The MF A prescribes the governance and 
management standards intended to protect the asset base and to promote efficient 
and accountable management of the assets. The governance preconditions under 
the MF A will require most iwi organisations to modify or amend their governance 
structures in order to receive the fisheries settlement assets provided by the 
settlement. This will have a significant influence on the future of the governance 
of iwi organisations. For this reason, the MF A is a pertinent example of 
legislative regulation of cultural characteristics in corporate governance. 
3. International Research 
Recent research suggests a renewed interest among legal scholars, 
multilateral institutions and the private sector in the significance of the role that 
culture may play in determining the shape of corporate governance systems. 
Cornell and Kalt have undertaken numerous studies to determine the fundamental 
elements of economic development and governance among indigenous nations in 
the United States and Canada.45 Significantly they have proposed a concept 
called cultural match. The concept of cultural match is about the fit between the 
formal institutions of governance and indigenous conceptions of how authority 
should be organised and exercised.4
6 Cornell and Kalt found that there is a need 
for a cultural match between the governance structures and procedures of an 
organisation and those it serves. A match of this nature facilitates more effective 
governance because the organisation is able to be governed in a manner consistent 
with the cultural interests of the members of the organisation. Their research 
44 Maori Fisheries Act 2004, 7th sch, kaupapa 9, 10 and 11. 
45 See <http: //www.ksg.harvard.edu/hpaied>. 
46 Stephen Cornell "The Importance and Power of Indigenous Self-Governance: Evidence from 
the United States" (Indigenous Governance Conference, Canberra, Australia, 3-5 April 2002). 
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demonstrates that governance systems and processes must be culturally attuned in 
order to have legitimacy with those they govern.47 
A number of other international studies suggest culture plays an 
important role in corporate governance. Research by Licht, Goldschmidt and 
Schwartz ("Licht et al") (2001) found that cultural values determine the 
acceptance and expression of corporate governance processes and systems.48 
Licht et al (2001) investigated the differing expression of shareholder and investor 
rights between nations. Their research demonstrated that corporate governance 
laws exhibit distinct cultural characteristics and that this leads to differing 
corporate governance systems between nations. They theorised that this is 
because the corporate setting is imbedded within the larger socio-cultural setting. 
Their findings concluded that the expression of these culturally divergent systems 
was unique between nations because of the 'fit' they had within the particular 
culture. 
Roe's study, which looked at the different methods of implementation of 
the same corporate governance law in different nations, supports Licht et al's 
(2001) research. Roe (2002) investigated the differing effect that culture had on 
the propensity to enter into interested party transactions without regard to the legal 
regulation of such transactions. He found that the expression of self dealing laws 
differed based on the prevailing cultural norms controlling and regulating 
behaviour. He also found that culture established the social context that would 
either facilitate or negate self dealing behaviour. He concluded that corporate law 
can be the same but cultural differences between those nations determine how 
corporate governance processes and systems are implemented in each nation.49 
Another study investigated how existing values in Brazllian society 
might prevent the adoption of corporate norms. The study found that both 
informal (culture and values) and formal (legal processes) institutions shape 
47 
Stephen Cornell "Starting and Sustaining Strong Indigenous Governance" (Presentation at the 
Conference on Building Effective Indigenous Governance, Jabiru, Northern Territory, Australia, 5 
November 2005); Manley A Begay and Stephen Cornell "What is Cultural Match and What Is It 
So Important?" (Presentation at the Conference on Building Effective Indigenous Governance, 
Jabiru, Northern Territory, Australia, 5 November 2005). 
48 Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz, above n 6; Roe, below n 49 . 
49 
Mark J Roe "Can Culture Ever Constrain the Economic Model of Corporate Law?" (2002) 69 U 
Chi L Rev 1255 . 
14 
corporate governance.so In this study, the prevailing Brazilian traditions, history 
and culture constrained the successful uptake of corporate reforms. The reforms 
were implemented to strengthen the failings of the Brazilian capital markets. In 
Brazil, privatisation had resulted in a concentration of the voting power of large 
stockholders resulting in significant agency problems. The Brazilian corporate 
law reforms were introduced in response to these failings as well as to address 
significant international pressure towards the adoption of and conformance with 
better standards of corporate governance. However, the reforms failed because 
these drivers could not overcome the centrality of the Brazilian culture and 
cultural ideology.st Gorga (2003) concluded that persistent cultural traits (such as 
patrimony) hindered the adoption of corporate norms designed to increase overall 
efficiency, because those norms were inconsistent with and could not overcome 
the deeply embedded Brazilian culture and ideologies. 
These studies provide a clear indication that culture and values affect the 
way law is interpreted and applied. 
Research also shows that culturally attuned governance systems are more 
effective than those that do not reflect or are inconsistent with the culture of the 
organisation and its members.s2 In fact, research from Asia has shown that 
problems arise when foreign law is transplanted without due consideration of the 
domestic legal culture into which it is being applied.s3 Licht et al (2001 ) found 
that shareholder's rights were not so well protected in Asian countries where such 
laws were introduced by colonial powers. A good fit between the transplanted 
laws and the cultural context in which the laws had to operate did not exist. 
54 
Consistent with Licht et al's (2001) findings, Tabalujan (2002) found 
discrepancies between corporate governance as legislated and corporate 
governance in practice. Tabalujan (2002) analysed corporate governance 
behaviour in Asian markets. His analysis focussed on corporate behaviour 
50 Gorga, above n 35, 6. 
51 Gorga, above n 35, 9. 
52 Amir N Licht, Chanan Goldschmidt and Shalom H Schwartz "Culture Rules: The Foundations 
of the Rule of Law and other Norms of Governance" (William Davidson Institute Working Papers 
Series 2003-605 , University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 2003) 32 sourced from 
<http: //ideas.repec.org/s/wd i/papers.html> (last accessed 19 September 2005). 
53 Benny S Tabalujan, Why Indonesian Corporate Governance Failed - Conjectures Concerning 
Legal Culture 15 Colum. J. Asian L. (2002) 141 , 164. 
54 Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz, above n 6. 
15 
exhibited in banks because they are the most stringently regulated organisations in 
the Asian market and therefore, theoretically, more likely to have robust corporate 
governance structures and practices than other less regulated organisations. 
Tabalujan (2002) found that legal culture has an influence on the corporate 
governance behaviour of individuals within organisations. This anomaly is 
observed particularly where foreign legal systems are incorporated into a domestic 
legal culture that is not receptive to the import. As also observed by Licht et al 
(2001 ), such inconsistency affects the implementation of the transplanted law 
within that legal system. 
These international studies are consistent with the view of the OECD that 
the basis for an effective corporate governance framework are appropriate and 
constructive legal, regulatory and institutional foundations_ upon which the market 
can rely. Effective corporate governance frameworks should typically comprises 
elements of legislation, regulation, self-regulatory arrangements, voluntary 
commitments and practices that are a result of a country's specific circumstance, 
history and tradition.55 This approach is consistent with statements by multilateral 
organisations, such as the European Union Commission on Corporate 
Governance, that corporate governance mechanisms should be tailored to a 
country's own cultural and business traditions. Of these, culture is highly 
important. 56 
These studies endorse the assertion made in this paper that culture does 
underlie corporate governance. Specifically, culture is significant in how law and 
in particular corporate governance systems are implemented. 
D. The Relevance of Culture in the New Zealand Context 
In New Zealand, debate on corporate governance has 'been particularly 
directed towards the governance of Maori and iwi organisations. This paper 
distinguishes between Maori organisations, those run by Maori; and iwi 
organisations, those run by Maori for their iwi. The credibility of the corporate 
55 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, above n 15, 29. 
56 
The EU Commission Corporate Governance Action Plan 2003 noted in Stilpon Nestor 
"Developing the Capacity to Explain Corporate Governance: The New Ch~llenge for European 
Companies (2003) in International Financial Law Review Corporate Governance 2003 (IFLR, 
London, 2003) 49. 
16 
governance processes of Maori and iwi organisations has increasingly come under 
scrutiny from the media and general public.57 Ongoing negative media attention 
alleging poor governance and excessive spending, the high profile nature of 
Treaty settlements (which are popularly perceived as 'public money'),58 and the 
recently commenced distribution of fisheries settlements assets by the corporate 
trustee company of TOKM, Te Ohu Kai Moana Trustee Limited ("TOKMTL"), 
have drawn attention to corporate governance systems and processes implemented 
by both Maori and iwi organisations. This increase in attention has been further 
exacerbated by the multidisciplinary nature of Maori organisations. 59 As a result, 
Maori and iwi organisations are now required to seek a balance between social, 
political, economic and cultural objectives. These include participating in 
settlement negotiations, political decision making, interacting with government, 
managing assets that arise from the settlement of Treaty claims or other 
allocations as well as the prov1s1on of social services.60 Maori and iwi 
organisations, especially those with a commercial focus , face challenges specific 
to these special roles and responsibilities. The main challenge faced by Maori and 
iwi organisations is the requirement to achieve dual legitimacy in both the cultural 
as well as legal contexts. This requires Maori and iwi organisations to unite 
cultural understandings and characteristics with modem commercial concepts and 
• 61 practices. 
Maori cultural values are informed from cultural values and beliefs 
specific to Maori (tikanga Maori). Mead (2003) provides an informative analysis 
of tikanga Maori which he articulates as unwritten norms based on values that 
guide behaviour and actions. He identifies these values as including 
57 Tait, below n 154; Fairfax, "Ngati Ruanui responsible for settlement problems-minister" ( 16 
September 2004) (sourced from http ://www.sutff.co.nz) ; J Stokes "lwi members feud over control 
of $41 m payout" (20 August 2004) The New Zealand Herald, Auckland, I ; J Stokes "Meremere 
jail consultation corrupt: lawyer" (25 March 2004) Waikato Times, Hamilton (sourced from 
http ://www.knowledge-basket .co.nz/). 
J Stokes "Private eye called in to check Tainui cash"( 14 April 2004) Waikato Times, Hamilton, l ; 
J Stokes "Report claims double-dipping at Tainui" ( 19 June 2004) Waikato Times, Hamilton, 
(sourced from http ://www.knowledge-basket.co.nz/). 
58 Mark Story "Maori Governance - Meeting the Cultural Challenge" (2005) 3:2 The Director 7, 8. 
59 Craig Coxhead and Guy Royal "Governance in Kaupapa Maori Organisations" (Presentation at 
New Zealand Maori Lawyers Conference, Christchurch, 16 September 2005). 
60 See Jones, below n 63 ; Te Puni Kokiri , below n 64 ; Shane Jones (Keynote Address at Hui 
Taumata 2005, Wellington, l March 2005); Rob McLeod "Developing Assets" (Keynote Address, 
Hui Taumata 2005, Wellington, 2 March 2005). 
61 Whitehead and Annesley, above n 14, 22 ; Story, above n 58 . 
whanaungatanga, manaakitanga (nurturing human relationships), mana (social 
status and power), tapu (sacred) and utu (reciprocity). 
Consistent with international trends, commentators m New Zealand 
acknowledge that culture plays a role in governance.62 For example, Jones (2002) 
argues that good governance requires an understanding of and alignment with the 
1 · 63 values and cultural norms prevalent within the re evant society or group. 
Fundamental cultural values and practices that are significant to the way 
governance structures and procedures are implemented in Maori and iwi 
organisations have been identified as including:64 
• Collective ownership (includes concepts of ownership, rights, and 
interests); 
• Whanaungatanga (encapsulates the dynamics of Maori identity, inter-
relationships and respective rights, obligations, and interests); and 
• Kaitiakitanga (encapsulates connections to resources and obligations of 
guardianship over both tangible and intangible items). 
This is by no means an exhaustive list of the cultural values and beliefs 
held by Maori. Maori are a heterogeneous group. No uniform or static view of 
cultural values and practices can be properly canvassed in the limited scope of this 
paper. 65 For the purposes of this paper, the culture of a Maori or iwi organisation 
is conceptualised as those agreed values upon which the entity is based and that 
are important to its members. 
Drawing on the observations made in this Part II, what then does this 
mean for the corporate governance of Maori and iwi organisations? Academic 
literature establishes that the relationship between the legal and the non-legal 
elements in corporate governance are dynamic, each capable of influencing the 
62 
NZBCSD and Westpac New Zealand, above n 5, 47-52. 
63 
Paul Jones Maori Governance - Foundations for Indigenous Social Capability (The Treasury, 
Wellington, 2002) 7. 
64 
Te Puni Kokiri The Contemporary Environment of Maori Collectives (Te Puni Kokiri , 
Wellington, 2005) 3. 
65 
See Mead, above n 26; New Zealand Law Commission Maori Custom and Values in New 
Zealand Law (Study Paper 9, NZLC, Wellington, 2001); Mason o 'urie Te Mana, Te 
Kawanatanga: The Politics of Maori Self-Determination (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 
2000). 
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content and expression of the other. 66 How then does this cultural influence 
manifest itself in Maori and iwi organisations? Is it through a cultural overlay or 
by culturally attuned systems? Cultural overlay is where culture informs and 
influences governance behaviour. In essence the cultural overlay is an informal 
mechanism by which culture influences corporate governance independently of 
any formal legal regulatory mechanism that is in place. Culturally attuned 
corporate governance systems exhibit cultural characteristics that are entrenched 
in the legal institutions that establish and regulate the organisation's governance 
systems and processes. This issue will be considered in more detail in Part IV C 
of this paper. 
66 Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz, above n 52, I 2-13 . 
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III WHAT DOES CULTURE DO TO CORPORA TE GOVERNANCE? 
-A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
A Introduction 
This section provides a comparative analysis of the differing ways that 
culture influences the expression and implementation of corporate governance. 
As discussed in Part I, the fundamental concepts that sit behind the 
notion of good corporate governance are commonly articulated as being 
Ownership and Control, Transparency and Accountability. 67 This section 
provides an analysis of these fundamental principles to show that their expression 
is subject to divergent cultural influence. This analysis compares case studies 
from various jurisdictions as against New Zealand case studies specific to Maori 
and iwi organisations. Particular focus will be given to the MF A because of the 
influence it has on the future of corporate governance arrangements of iwi 
organisations. 
B Ownership and Control 
Control structures and ownership arrangements are an important element 
of corporate governance.68 One way to analyse the influence of culture on the 
ownership and control of organisations is to examine culturally divergent property 
rights ideologies. The examination of property rights is useful because property 
rights are said to give shape to organisations as well as prescribe the mechanisms 
available to perform essential corporate governance functions. 69 Property rights 
are said to affect corporate governance in two fundamental and related ways. 
67 
See NZBCSD and Westpac New Zealand, above n 5, 12; Whitehead and Annesley, above n 14; 
Licht, below n 75, 50; Jones, above n 63; New Zealand Law Commission, below n 137; Te Arawa 
Maori Trust Board Post Settlement Governance Entity for the Arawa Lakes - Discussion 
Document (Te Arawa Maori Trust Board, Rotorua, 2005); Te Puni Kokiri Hei Whakatinana i te 
Tuurua Pao - Business Success and Maori Organisational Governance Management Study (Te 
Puni Kokiri, Wellington, 2003). 
68 
Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman "The End of History for Corporate Law" in Geoffrey N 
Gordon and Mark J Row (eds) Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004) 215; Milhaupt, below n 69. 
69 
Curtis J Milhaupt "Property Rights in Firms" in Geoffrey N Gordon and Mark J Row (eds) 
Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2004) 241. 
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Firstly, they determine the organisational structure of an entity, and secondly, they 
determine the legal controls for the entity. 
70 
The cultural characteristics that shape the expression of property rights 
are different for each cultural group. Analysis of differing ownership 
arrangements illustrates that property rights institutions are a fundamental cause 
of diversity between national governance systems. This is evident from 
international comparative research between Asian and Western concepts of the 
corporate entity.
71 Research from Asian countries suggests that these property 
rights perceptions are founded on cultural concepts that include familial obligation 
and reciprocity, 72
 co-operation and trust, 
73 patrimonial ism ( denoting a patriarchal 
system of relationships)7
4 and piety.75 Mana, whakapapa and kaitiakitanga are the 
cultural characteristics fundamental to the understanding and expression of 
property rights within the context of the corporate governance of Maori and iwi 
organisations. Mana is the ability to exercise authority or control over people and 
resources. Whakapapa can be understood as the foundation which provides an 
individual with their connection to other people, the natural environment and the 
spiritual world. 76
 Kaitiakitanga ( as stated previously in Part II D) relates to the 
protection of resources and obligations of guardianship. 
77 
Because Maori and iwi organisations are conventionally governed by a 
combination of formal and informal structures, 
78 the culturally variant property 
rights characteristics of whakapapa, kaitiakitanga and mana are expressed through 
both legal (formal) and non-legal (informal) mechanisms. 
70 Milhaupt, above n 69. 
7 1 Phillip Lawton "Berte and Means, Corporate Governance and the Chinese Family
 Firm" ( 1996) 
6 AJ Corp L 357. 
72 Lawton, above n 71. 
73 Curtis J Milhaupt "A Relationship Theory of Japanese Corporate Governanc
e: Contract, 
Culture, and the Rule of Law" ( I 996) 37 Harv lnt'l L J 3. 
74 Tabalujan, above n 53. 
75 Amir N Licht "Legal Plug-Ins: Cultural Distance, Cross-Listing, and Corporate
 Governance 
Reform" (2004) 22 Berkeley J lnt'l L 159. 
76 Pou Temara "Brief of Evidence" (High Court of New Zealand, CIV-2004-463
-000847, 21 
September 2005). 
77 Te Puni Kokiri , above n 64. 
78 NZBCSD and Westpac New Zealand, above n 5, 52. 
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I . Cultural Influence by formal means 
The ownership arrangements and control structures within the MF A can 
be seen as path dependent upon the cultural foundation of the property rights 
embodied in the fisheries settlement assets. The MF A determines the form in 
which those property rights may now be enjoyed and expressed. For this reason 
the MF A is a pertinent example of the expression of culturally variant property 
rights through formal processes ie culturally attuned corporate governance. 
The MF A is a legislative and regulatory regime to both provide for and 
regulate legislative prescription of cultural influence in corporate governance and 
asset management. TOKM considers the ongoing protection of the assets and 
their ownership by Maori as fundamentally important because of the finality of 
the settlement and the rights that the assets represent. 79· This is an important 
distinction from historical Treaty settlements where rights have already been 
extinguished. In this instance, Maori lost their rights in commercial fisheries 
through the operation of the fisheries settlement deal. The cash and quota in this 
contemporary Treaty settlement is a proxy for those rights that were effectively 
exchanged (rather than extinguished) under the settlement through the exchange 
of the customary rights for the settlement assets. 80 Because this is an exchange of 
rights for assets, the assets have a heightened importance. This concept forms the 
basis of the continuing obligations imposed by the MF A to maintain the 
settlement assets in an inter-generational sense for future generations. For this 
reason, the fisheries settlement imposes unique ownership and control 
arrangements upon the management and use of the settlement assets. 
Protection of the assets through the ownership and control restrictions 
imposed by the MF A is, TOKM considers, consistent with the way in which the 
assets would traditionally have been 'owned' and dealt with (ie a collectively 
owned asset).81 The requirement that members of an iwi organisation affiliate 
through descent from a primary ancestor ensures that the cultural characteristic of 
whakapapa is expressed within the ownership and control frameworks of that 
79 
Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission Ahu Whakamua - Report for Agreement (Treaty of 
Waitangi Fisheries Commission, Wellington, 2002) 46. 
80 Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission, above n 39, 4. 
81 Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission, above n 79. 
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organisation.
82 As discussed in Part II D, membership through kinship will often 
allow individual members to access the benefits derived from collective
ly held 
assets, such as those arising from the Maori fisheries settlement, without
 having 
any individual ownership rights to the assets. It is this expression of co
llective 
ownership based on kinship within a corporate ownership framework 
that is 
unique to Maori. In effect, the MF A is replicating within a legislative fram
ework 
the property rights concepts associated with the customary rights that th
e assets 
represent. Interestingly, and consistent with the analysis above, the MF A d
oes not 
confer the full complement of Western property rights upon iwi organisa
tions or 
members. The restrictions in the MF A limit the liquidity of the assets. 
This is 
also related to the collective genesis of the rights which the fisheries set
tlement 
assets represent.
83 This example illustrates the mutually reinforcing relationship 
that culture and law have. Cultural characteristics have informed the devel
opment 
of the MF A and influenced the expression of the culturally informed p
roperty 
rights the MF A establishes. 
The concept of kaitiakitanga also features strongly in the restrictions the 
MF A imposes. In the context of the MF A, kaitiakitanga is understoo
d to be 
analogous to the concept of sustainability and encompasses the wise and 
prudent 
management of the resource. 
84 This principle is represented in the MF A through 
the imposition of restrictions on the use of the settlement assets and throug
h broad 
duties imposed upon the elected representatives. Section 12(1)(a) of th
e MFA 
requires iwi organisations to act for the benefit of all the members of the iw
i. This 
obligation extends to future as well as present members. This obligation 
reflects 
the collective nature of the original rights upon which the assets are fo
unded. 
Sections 69 and 161 of the MF A also act to safeguard the assets. Sec
tion 69 
restricts the disposal of income shares by the entity. Section 161 r
estricts 
alienation of settlement quota assets. The restriction in section 161 (1) 
ensures 
that only Maori organisations may hold settlement quota that is the subjec
t of the 
MF A. Sections 69 and 161 operate to establish a restricted class of ow
nership 
rights consistent with the property rights framework from which the set
tlement 
82 Maori Fisheries Act 2004, s5 (see definition of "Member of an Iwi") . 
83 New Zealand Institute of Economic Research Preserving Fisheries Quota 
for Maori - Report to 
the Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission (NZIER, Wellington, 2002) 7
. 
84 lwi Forum Te Amorangi Hei Mua - A Model f or A/location of the Fis
heries Settlement 
developed by the lwi Forum (Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission, W
ellington, 2002) 13 . 
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assets derive. Further restrictions, such as the requirement to register quota 
interests (section 157) and member approval of settlement quota sales (section 
162) reinforce the assertion that the MF A entrenches the property rights concepts 
specific to a Maori property rights framework. 
Further protections, consistent with the concept of kaitiakitanga, are 
provided by separating ownership from management and requiring independent 
director mechanisms. Kaupapa 9 of Schedule 7 of the MF A relates to the 
separation of ownership from management between the parent entity, the asset 
holding company and any commercial fisheries company established by the iwi 
organisation. This reinforces the transparency between the responsibilities of 
each entity. It also produces clear lines of accountability as well as recognises the 
importance of keeping the various functions separate ie political representation, 
asset protection, and commercial enterprise. 
Analogies can be drawn between the system of regulation set out in the 
MF A and ownership arrangement developments in Japan. Historically, the 
Japanese organisation was founded on the Confucian system and strictly family 
owned and managed. 85 The Confucian value and belief system is still a central 
component of Japanese culture.86 Accordingly, the Japanese firm is still is often a 
reflection of cultural traits for example, the primacy of the family and co-
operation and trust, rather than a reflection of formal rules. 87 However, in 
response to external influences these ownership structures have gradually opened 
up to non-kin investors and professional managers in the early part of this century. 
Legal reforms, such as the 2003 amendment to the Japanese Commercial Code, 
provide for an greater variation in ownership structures and arrangements. The 
reforms allow for even more choice in corporate governance systems. 
Organisations may now choose to utilise the traditional Japanese corporate 
governance system which comprises a 'board of statutory auditors' structure or can 
implement a new organisational control structure based on a 'company with 
85 
Dwight H Perkins "Law, Family Ties, and the East Asian Way of Business" in Lawrence E 
Harrison and Samuel P Huntington (eds) Culture Matters - How Values Shape Human Progress 
(Basic Books, New York, 2000) 234. 
86 Perkins, above n 85 . 
87 Milhaupt, above n 73 , 5. 
committees' system. 
88 These options provide organisations the opportunity to use 
the United States-style corporate structure (board of directors and audit, 
nomination, compensation and special assets committees).
89 This example shows 
that even though Japanese corporate governance rests on a foundation of culture, 
formal regulation (ie law) has played a major role in shaping the modem 
ownership and control relationships in corporate Japan.
90 The MF A will have an 
analogous impact upon iwi organisations. 
Further, international research suggests that Asian concepts of the 
corporate entity and property rights institutions are distinctly different from the 
Western (Anglo-Saxon) viewpoint. Lawton (1996) argues that the Western 
concept of the corporate entity creates a juristic 'person' separate and distinct from 
its members and informed by western property rights concepts.
91 The Asian (and 
in particular, Chinese) perception of this 'person' is not separate but connected to 
and imbued with overtones of reciprocal relations centred around the importance 
of family. 92 Similarly, in South Korea, property rights arrangements are based on 
traditional Confucian values. This has resulted in the development of firms that 
are relatively small and clustered into highly diversified groups with ownership 
and management concentrated in the family grouping. This conglomerate 
structure is called a chaebol and is a derivative of the Japanese ownership 
structure. 93 Chaebol are a model of family capitalisation that unite ownership and 
control. This is distinct from the governance and management separation that is 
observed in Anglo-Saxon corporate governance models. Commentators relate 
these features to Korea's long Confucian heritage which places a strong emphasis 
on the traditional extended family and filial piety.
94 
What these examples show are that there are marked differences in the 
ownership structures of companies in different countries. This corporate 
ownership and structure diversity is consistent with the implications of culturally 
88 Mitsuru Tanaka "Japanese Corporate Governance" in International Financial 
Law Review 
Corporate Governance 2003 (IFLR, London, 2003) 125 . 
89 Freshfields "Recent Amendments to the Japanese Commercial Code • An Overvie
w" (February 
2003) sourced from http: '!www .freshfields.com
1 (last accessed 8 October 2005). 
90 Milhaupt, above n 73 , 7. 
9 1 Lawton, above n 71 . 
92 Lawton, above n 71 , 348. 
93 Licht, above n 75, 24. 
94 Licht, above n 75 , 26 . 
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divergent property rights concepts. The conclusion to be drawn from the 
examples provided, is that culturally informed characteristics influence the 
ownership and control arrangements of organisations. 
2. Cultural influence by informal means 
In a more generic sense (as distinct from the property rights analysis 
above) expression of cultural concepts through informal processes can be 
observed in both the behaviour of individuals within the organisation as well as in 
the constitutional and policy documents of the organisation. 
In the Indonesian context, patrimonialism is suggested as the key element 
of Indonesian legal culture that directly affects corporate governance behaviour.95 
Tabalujan (2002) suggests that it is possible for patrimonial tendencies to affect 
corporate governance such that corporate institutions and relationships are viewed 
through a familial obligation, as opposed to legal, perspective.96 An example of 
this approach can be seen in the corporate rescue strategy implemented for Bank 
Summa. The controlling family held 70 per cent of the shares with market value 
of $US974 million. The bank had underperforming loans totalling $850 million 
of which $700 million was owed by Summa Group entities. The controlling 
family went to extraordinary lengths to save the bank and assumed responsibility 
when there was no legal obligation to do so.97 This case study shows the 
pervasiveness that cultural factors , such as loyalty and familial obligation, have in 
the expression of ownership arrangements and control elements of corporate 
governance. 
Implementation of cultural characteristics in constitutional and policy 
documents is illustrated in the, New Zealand context in iwi organisations such as 
Te Runanga a Iwi o Ngapuhi Charitable Trust ("TRAION"). TRAION is an iwi 
organisation who acts on behalf of the tribe of Ngapuhi. TRAION utilised the 
template constitutional documents developed by TOKMTL as a basis for 
modifying their organisational structure and corporate governance to fit with the 
requirements of the MF A. In addition, they also amended the constitution to 
95 Tabalujan, above n 53 , 165. 
96 Tabalujan, above n 53 , 165 . 
97 Tabalujan, above n 53 , 141. 
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reflect the cultural values and beliefs specific to their iwi. TRAION were able to 
add the cultural match that Cornell and Kalt discuss by incorporating specific 
cultural objectives as well as tribally relevant representation and dispute 
resolution mechanisms. Specifically, this cultural overlay requires Ngapuhi to, 
among other things drive the spiritual, cultural, social on economic growth for the 
Ngapuhi people; be guided by the principles embodied in the Treaty, kaitiakitanga 
and ahi ka; make decisions consistent with the tikanga of Ngapuhi; and develop, 
promote and abide by the tikanga and spiritual values of Ngapuhi in all its 
operations.98 A common cultural feature in the governance of iwi organisations is 
that elected representatives are often appointed from the organisation's 
membership. This is the case in respect of TRAION representatives who must be 
registered members,99 elected by wards but have an overriding duty to represent 
the interests of all members 100 as well as be active in their ward.
101 This 
document was recently ratified by TRAION and its members and accepted by 
TOKMTL as meeting the constitutional requirements of the MF A. This is an 
example of cultural characteristics (specifically, tribal tikanga) being imported 
into the governance processes of the organisations, over and above those cultural 
characteristics that the MF A provides for. Of future interest will be how the 
cultural characteristics are actually expressed, interpreted and implemented in the 
governance processes of the organisation. 
A relevant example of the potential for a disjunct between form and 
practice, is the Tainui litigation.102 The underlying issue in this series of litigation 
was the inconsistency between the cultural artifices and commercial governance 
practices surrounding governance, representation and accountability. In order to 
circumvent this disjunct, some Maori and iwi organisations have introduced 
culturally informed legal institutions into their governance systems. Te Wananga 
o Aotearoa ("Wananga"), a Maori organisation that has been criticised recently 
for governance shortcomings, has introduced an advisory board called Nga Tuara 
98 Te Rilnanga a lw'i o Ngapuhi Charitable Trust Deed, cl 3.2. 
99 Te Rilnanga a lw'i o Ngapuhi Charitable Trust Deed, I 
st Sch, Part A, paragraph 2. 
too Above n 99. 
10 1 Te Rilnanga a lwi' o Ngapuhi Charitable Trust Deed, 1 s
t Sch, Part A, paragraph 7. 
'
02 Mahula v Porima (22 September 2000) M238/00 ; Mahula v Porima (9 November 2000) 
M290/00 ; Porima v Te Kauhanganui o Waikato Inc Soc Ors (26 September 2000) M208/00 ; 
Porima & Ors v Waikato Raupatu Trustee Company Ltd (20 February 2001) M330/00 ; Porima v 
Te Kauhanganui o Waikato Inc [200 I] I NZLR 472 . 
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into the governance systems of the organisation. Nga Tuara is comprised of 
respected individuals (some of whom are previous Wananga directors) with 
institutional knowledge and tikanga expertise. 103 It is hoped that this mechanism 
will meet the Anglo-Saxon standards of 'good corporate governance' whilst still 
recognising and providing appropriate mechanisms for the expression of cultural 
influences. In this way, the Wananga has incorporated a model similar to the 
German two-tier governance system. The German model was developed to 
provide for a wider stakeholder focus. It links persons other than the owners with 
the organisation, thus facilitating wider stakeholder participation in the 
governance of the organisation. This solution provides the Wananga, and 
potentially other Maori or iwi organisations, with the ability to provide for 
stakeholder participation that is culturally attuned. This advisory board model 
allows these organisations to incorporate informal . influences within the 
framework of the legal institutions. This is a pragmatic solution to the 
acknowledged challenge faced by Maori organisations to fit the demands of the 
commercial world with the cultural characteristics specific to their organisation. 104 
What each of these examples show is that cultural characteristics inform 
the ownership arrangements of organisations through the way in which culturally 
divergent property rights perceptions are expressed in the formal corporate 
governance frameworks as well as the informal corporate governance processes of 
the organisation. Accordingly, culture is integral to the formation of corporate 
governance ownership arrangements as well as the expression of ownership 
rights. 
C Transparency 
Transparency 1s about providing stakeholders with confidence in 
decision-making processes. Transparency can be implemented both through 
internal governance procedures as well as through external legal or regulatory 
mechanisms. It helps to ensure that the assets are being used in the interests of all 
financial stakeholders and enhances the processes of scrutiny and accountability 
103 Coxhead and Royal, above n 59. 
104 
See NZBCSD and Westpac New Zealand, above n 5, 52 ; Coxhead and Royal , above n 59; Jones, above n 63 ; Te Puni Kokiri, above n 64. 
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in the organisation. 105 Specifically, transparency can prevent insiders engaging in 
related party transactions, fraudulent accounting, abuses of power and 
corruption. 106 A strong disclosure regime that promotes real transparency is a 
pivotal feature of good governance. 
107 In comparison, weak disclosure and non-
transparent practices can contribute to unethical behaviour and a loss of market 
integrity. 108 
1. Independence 
Licht (2003) has identified that perceptions of the concept of 
independence differ between cultures. 
109 The Anglo-Saxon model of corporate 
governance strongly subscribes to the value that the principle of independence 
provides for ensuring well functioning corporate governance systems. It 
recommends that at least a substantial number of board members should be 
independent. 11 0 However, the exact definition or understanding of what 
'independent' means varies between individuals, countries and cultures.
111 
Research has found that Koreans can not fulfil the role of independent directors as 
effectively or in line with expectations in the United States because of their 
different cultural constructs. 
112 Korean perceptions manifest in culturally 
divergent values and beliefs, including a cultural preference for conformity 
against individuality and a different understanding of the scope and meaning of 
independence. 11 3 
105 See Barrett, above n 1, 9; Shen, below n 127, 22 ; Joern Berglund Nielsen "Transparency, 
Accountability and Doing the Job" in Edward Te Kohu Douglas and Mark Roberston-Shaw (eds) 
Ngai Tatou 2020: indigenous Governance and Accountability (Foundation for Indigenous 
Research in Society and Technology, Auckland, 1999; Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development, above n 15 ; Nick Bradley "How to Measure and Analyze Corporate 
Governance" in International Financial Law Review Corporate Governance 2003 (IFLR, London, 
2003) 40 . 
106 Shen, below n 127, 29-33 ; Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz, above n 52, 10. 
107 Joseph Healey Corporate Governance and Wealth Creation in New Zealand (Dunmore Press, 
Palmerston North, 2003). 
108 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, above n 15 , 49. 
109 Licht, above n 75 , 45 . 
11 0 See for example, The Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance Report on 
the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance ("Cadbury Report'') (CF ACG and Gee and Co 
Ltd, London, 1992); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, above n 15: 
Committee on Corporate Governance Final Report ("Hampel Report'') (CCG and Gee and Co Ltd, 
London, 1998); and New Zealand Securities Commission's Corporate Governance in New 
Zealand- Principles and Guidelines (New Zealand Securities Commission, Wellington, 2003). 
111 Licht, above n 75, 45. 
11 2 Licht, above n 75 , 44 . 
11 3 Licht, above n 75 , 45. 
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This differing view of independence is observed in the governance of 
Maori and iwi organisations. This can be accredited to the centrality of the Maori 
h d l l .d · 114 
cultural concepts of whanaungatanga and s are cu tura 1 entity. 
Whanaungatanga is integral to informing the cultural perception of independence 
in Maori and iwi organisations. As previously discussed, whanaungatanga 
embodies the kinship relationships that are founded on blood links and reinforced 
by cultural factors such as ageism and seniority of bloodlines. Mead (2003) refers 
to these concepts as encompassed within the broader principle of mana. Mana 
affects inter-personal relationships so that all interactions are overlayed by 
cultural factors. 115 Ageism impacts on the interactions between directors of 
differing ages and social status. Kaumatua (respected elders) are afforded greater 
respect by those of lesser age, irrespective of the role each may have within the 
governance structure of the organisation.' 16 This influences the ability of each 
individual to act independent of this cultural overlay when interacting in the 
context of the governance and management of the organisation. Bloodline 
seniority also impacts on interactions in a similar way as ageism. These both have 
real and visible impact on the governance and management of Maori and iwi 
organisations as well as on the dynamics and effectiveness of the governance 
board itself. 117 
Allegations of nepotism, favouritism and lack of independence have been 
made against Maori and iwi organisations on a regular basis recently. The 
Wananga is currently the subject of an Audit by the Office of the Auditor General, 
focused on the Wananga's procurement policies and practices, particularly in 
respect of selected transactions where Wananga councillors, employees and their 
close relatives are involved. This perception of nepotism and lack of 
independence Coxhead (2005) argues, can be referenced to the exponential 
growth of Maori and iwi organisations. What were previously small enterprises 
of limited cash and asset base are now multi-million dollar organisations with 
substantial economic and political influence. During their initial development 
114 
Richard Meade An Economic Appraisal of Nga Tipu Whakaritorito - A New Governance Model for Maori Collectives (New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation Inc, Wellington, 2005). 
115 Mead, above n 26. 
116 Coxhead and Royal, above n 59. 
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these organisations utilised family and associates who they could trust and who 
worked for the cause rather than for financial incentive. This is the concept of 
whanaungatanga in practice. This culturally informed institutional history is 
embedded within the organisation. As these organisations have grown in size and 
asset base they have come under increasing external scrutiny to dispel those 
entrenched practices and comply with the Anglo-Saxon good governance 
standards that oppose such coalescing of interests. In response, some Maori and 
iwi organisations have added an extra layer of governance systems to combat this 
cultural influence. For example, advisory bodies of kaurnatua as in the Ngati Awa 
example of the Kahui Kaumatua. Some organisations, such as Tainui Group 
Holdings ("TGH") have even restructured their governance systems to prevent 
cultural influence. TGH's original board was comprised of shareholder 
representatives. However, in the face of poor accountability and poor financial 
asset performance, TGH modified their board composition to a blend of 
independent and representative membership.
118 This governance structure was 
implemented to facilitate independence in decision-making. 
However, even the implementation of such good governance practices is 
subject to cultural influence. Conflicts registers of Maori and iwi organisations 
show a large number of inter-relationships and interests between owners, directors 
and stakeholders. This is a product of the Maori cultural focus on inter-
relatedness and familial connections (whanaungatanga and whakap~pa).
119 It is 
also interesting to note that the application of good governance systems for Maori 
and iwi organisations consistently requires of those organisations a level of 
compliance over and above that which other (non-Maori) organisations must 
comply with. A case in point is the requirement that individuals list iwi 
affiliations in the Wananga conflicts register.
120 Therefore, conflicts of interests 
and self regulation issues are more difficult for Maori and iwi organisations 
because they have to account for and attempt to overcome, in a manner acceptable 
to regulators, the additional cultural overlay inherent in their governance 
processes and systems. Indeed, the complexity of Maori social and cultural 
118 NZBCSD and Westpac New Zealand, above n 5, 60. 
119 Cox.head and Royal, above n 59. 
12° Cox.head and Royal, above n 59. 
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understandings creates an extra overlay that other (non-Maori) organisations do 
not have to manage. 
The MF A has also attempted to deal with cultural characteristics. 
Kaupapa 10 of Schedule 7 of the MF A imposes the requirement for the asset 
holding entity to have a majority of independent directors. The MF A specifies 
that the directors of that entity may not make up more than 40 per cent of the 
representatives from the parent organisation. In the author's opinion, this 
provision not only protects against self dealing, but also acts to mitigate any loss 
of transparency by clearly separating the governance and management functions . 
2. Disclosure and reporting 
Disclosure practices vary widely both within and across countries. 121 
This is because the environment (which includes social, political and economic 
factors) in which organisations operate affects financial reporting and 
disclosure. 122 Culture impacts upon disclosure choices through both the personal 
values and beliefs of the decision-maker as well as the external cultural drivers 
that impinge on or sustain the expression of that cultural belief.123 In other 
words, culture impacts on how disclosure decisions are made ,because those in 
charge of the disclosure decisions are affected by their own cultural values. For 
example, it is widely accepted that cultural considerations can be and are 
incorporated into financial reporting and disclosure by organisations through 
reporting methods such as quadruple bottom line reporting. How the 'cultural' 
bottom line is expressed is culturally specific to each country. · Research has 
shown that the United States' disclosure system is a construct of the United States 
culture, developed to identify corporate governance information significant to the 
United States' perspective alone. It is not surprising then that the United States' 
disclosure system has been found to be insensitive to cultural characteristics 
different from that of its founding culture. 124 
12 1 
Ole-Kristian Hope "Firm-level Disclosures and the Relative Roles of Culture and Legal Origin" 
(2003) 14JIFMA218. 
122 Hope, above n 121 . 
123 Hope, above n 121 . 
124 Licht, above n 7, 26. 
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In Asian countries, the pervading cultural influence of group obligation is 
evidenced by widespread fraudulent information disclosure. 
125 
Commentators 
argue that this is a remnant of the Confucian precepts that persist in Asian society, 
forming the basic guidelines for the formation of attitudes and the expression of 
practices. Laws are viewed as merely a device of the government to restrict 
behaviour and not regarded as representing either the culturally informed 
guidelines or principles on which the society is actually based. 
126 
Initiatives to 
resolve this issue in the Asian markets include strengthened regulation for 
information disclosure requirements, imposition of standard formats for disclosure 
and strengthened control over related party transactions.
127 
In the authors experience most iwi organisations are constituted as trusts 
or incorporated societies registered under the Charitable Trust Act 1957. Such 
organisations are not required to file annual returns thereby reducing 
accountability to their members. The Charities Act 2005 ("Act") attempts to 
provide greater transparency in the operations, activities, purposes and financial 
data of charities. Importantly, the Act imposes a requirement to file an annual 
return (which will be publicly available) with the Charities Commission, who are 
charged with monitoring charities' activities. 128 
Methods to account for cultural influences and the lack of accountability 
by iwi organisations to their members are observed in Schedule T of the MF A. 
Kaupapa 7 of Schedule 7 requires the entity to report annually to its members. In 
particular, the MF A contains a requirement for the organisation to report on 
interactions with other iwi organisations in relation to fisheries matters.
129 
Matters that must be reported to the members at each annual meeting include 
steps to increase membership, comparisons between performance and objectives, 
audited accounts and quota sale and exchange information. The disclosure 
requirements of the MF A place a positive obligation upon iwi organisations, who 
125 Seymour Martin Lipset and Gabriel Salman Lenz "Corruption, Culture, and Markets" in 
Harrison, Lawrence E and Samuel P Huntington (eds) Culture Matters - How Values Shape 
Human Progress (Basic Books, New York, 2000) 123. 
126 Boye De Mente Korean Etiquette and Ethics in Business (NTC Business Books, Lincolnwood, 
Illinois, 1990) 49. 
127 Professor Sibao Shen "China's New Corporate Governance Measures after its Accession into 
the WTO (2004) 17 AJ Corp L 6, 9. 
128 Charities Act 2005, s 41. 
129 Maori Fisheries Act 2004, 7th Sch, kaupapa 7(2)(a)(v). 
33 
are subject to the MF A, to disclose key mm1mum information and thereby 
mitigates against cultural influences that may predispose weak or non-existent 
disclosure. Interestingly, the MF A does not go as far as to entrench in legislation 
'culturally attuned' disclosure. However, it is an approach that allows scope for 
the operation of such cultural influence whilst ensuring that minimum disclosure 
and reporting standards are adhered to. 
3. Asset protection 
Culture informs behaviour and perceptions of the appropriate responses 
for certain situations as well as informing perceptions of third party behaviour. 130 
Studies show that culture appears to be one of the factors that influence self 
dealing because it affects the way self dealing is viewed and regulated and the 
way individuals behave. 131 Research has also shown that self dealing is more 
prevalent in countries where the culture is predisposed against showings of wealth 
and materialism. 132 Research on insider trading and self dealing rates in Japan, 
Korea and Germany has shown that insider trading is tolerated more in these 
countries than in the United States. In fact, in some instances there was a total 
lack of stigma associated with this type of behaviour. 133 In contrast, the United 
States holds a very hostile stance towards insider trading. This adverse view of 
self dealing is rationalised as being founded on ethical principles based on 
egalitarianism and equity. These principles have a greater influence on the legal 
culture of the United States. In essence, the United States has culturally informed 
value dimensions that condemn such behaviour. This condemnation has 
promoted the expression of anti-self dealing rules. 134 Competitive pressures have 
been acknowledged as a factor in the convergence of cultural attitudes towards 
insider trading. However, it can still be reasonably asserted that nations will 
differ considerably in the degree their cultural values impact on their compliance 
with or enforcement of insider trading regulation. 135 
130 Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz, above n 6, 6. 
131 Licht, above n 7, 21 . 
132 Roe, above n 49 . 
133 Licht, above n 7, 77. 
134 Licht, above n 7 71 . 
135 Licht, above n 7, 72-73 . 
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Conflict of interests are a major issue for Maori and iwi organisations, 
where officeholders (or governors) are elected as representatives of a group via 
ward systems (for example a hapu or marae). This dynamic provides interesting 
and difficult issues because representative officeholders tend to confuse actual or 
perceived obligations to the group that elected them with their primary (often 
statutory) duties and obligations to the organisation.
136 An example illustrating 
this type of issue is when a decision is required to be made in the best interests of 
the organisation that is not in the best interests of the hapu or marae that the 
director represents. This is an important justification for separating the political 
and governance aspects of an organisation. 
Legislative mechanisms are a tangible legal technique used to regulate 
and set behavioural standards for directors.
137 In New Zealand, the most apparent 
regulator of directors actions and decisions is the Companies Act 1993. 
Obligations in relation to good faith, exercising powers, compliance with 
corporate documents, protection of shareholder wealth and fiscal responsibility set 
the standards that directors are measured against.
138 The MFA has dealt with the 
issue of self interest and conflicts of interest both through statutory and procedural 
methods. The MF A legislative mechanisms to avert such outcomes include the 
separation of ownership from management, the imposition of 'strategic 
governance' obligations, and the requirement that directors on the _management 
entity do not comprise more than 40 per cent of members from the governing 
body.139 
The separation of governance and management of the asset is important 
for the responsible and transparent management of the assets. 
14° Combined with 
the 'strategic governance' requirement under Kaupapa 11 of Schedule 7 of the 
MF A, these mechanisms set clear legislative limitations on the extent to which 
cultural factors can influence the decisions made by, and actions of, 
representatives or directors. This facilitates the ability to focus on relevant 
obligations only and reduces the scope for confusion surrounding roles and 
136 Coxhead and Royal , above n 59. 
137 New Zealand Law Commission Treaty of Waitangi Claims: Addressing the Post-Settlement 
Phase (Study Paper 13 , NZLC, Wellington, 2002). 
138 Companies Act 1993 , ss 130-139. 
139 Maori Fisheries Act 2004, ss 12( I)( d), 16(1 )( e) and 7
th Sch, kaupapa 9-11. 
140 Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission, above n 39. 
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responsibilities. However, it is important to note that the statutory limitation will 
not guard against culturally influenced actions of governors or directors that are 
within the scope of their roles and responsibilities. 
The procedural method implemented by TOKMTL to deal with conflicts 
of interests is through the template constitutional documents TOKMTL have 
developed to assist iwi organisations in complying with the MF A. The conflicts 
of interests clause in the template constitutional documents are an example of how 
differing cultural perceptions of independence are dealt with within the 
framework of Anglo-Saxon corporate governance mechanisms. The clause 
states: 141 
No trustee will be interested in a matter where that Trustee is a 
member of a [Iwi/Hapu/Whanau] and where his or her interest is 
not different in kind from the interests of other members of that 
[I wi/Hapu/Whanau] . 
This clause accounts for the unique cultural characteristics that directors 
are also likely to be members of the organisation and whakapapa and 
whanaungatanga factors will inform the actions and behaviours of the directors. 
D Accountability 
Accountability provides for the monitoring and sanctioning of delegated 
authority.142 The concept of accountability is founded on power relationships. 
The essence of this power relationship is that the party holding power owes 
certain duties (such as giving account of and explaining decisions or actions) to 
the party subject to the power. This obligation operates to prevent abuse by the 
power holder. Accountability features as a highly desirable element of good 
governance practice. A commonly held view is that accountability facilitates 
effective governance because it makes the organisation accountable to its many 
stakeholders through reporting requirements and control structures. 143 
141 
Te Ohu Kai Moana Trustee Limited Template MIO Constitutional Deed (TOKMTL, 
Wellington, 2005) cl 4.14. 
142 
Robert Monks and Nell Minow "The Director's New Clothes or, the Myth of Corporate 
Accountability" in Chew, Donald H (Junior) and Stuart L Gillan (eds) Corporate Governance at 
the Cross Roads (McGraw-Hill Irwin, New York, 2005) 52. 143 Barrett, above n I. 
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A number of accountability mechanisms are provided for in the MF A to 
ensure an iwi organisation is and remains accountable to its members. 144 The first 
is the reporting and disclosure requirements. These reporting obligations ensure 
that key statutory actions and decisions are transparently reported to members.
145 
The second mechanism is through the election or appointment of office holders as 
set out in Kaupapa 1 and 2 of Schedule 7. Once elected an office holder has, by 
operation of section 12(1) of the MF A, a specific statutory duty to represent the 
interests of all members of the iwi irrespective of whether the officeholder is 
elected by a particular group of stakeholders. This wider accountability is a direct 
attempt to exclude any cultural influence associated with a ward system of 
representation that is based on whakapapa and open to influence by the Maori 
cultural values of whanaungatanga and whakapapa. 
A further accountability mechanism built into the MF A is the protection 
afforded to the settlement assets if they are to be sold or exchanged. For example, 
section 162(1) requires a multiple-step process to be complied with in order to sell 
settlement quota. Firstly, the proposal to sell must be notified to members; and 
secondly, the proposal to dispose of the settlement quota needs to be approved by 
75 per cent of the adult members who vote. This approval imposes limitations 
that are more onerous than other similar statutory provisions, such as the 
Companies Act 1993 shareholder approval of major transactions, because it 
applies in every instance that the iwi organisation wishes to dispose of settlement 
quota. However, in light of the important cultural values that under-pin the 
protection mechanisms set out in the MF A, member's approval to the disposal of 
collective assets is in this instance appropriate. 
I. Financial accountability 
As has been previously stated, people from different cultures exhibit 
differences in their perception and judgment. This directly affects corporate 
144 Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission He Tahu Arahi - A Guide to Representation on Jwi 
Organisations (Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission, Wellington, 2001). 
145 Maori Fisheries Act 2004, 7t1, Sch, kaupapa 7. 
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governance. 146 In particular, cultural factors have been shown to have an effect on 
accounting and auditing systems. 147 
Although commentators have identified a trend towards the 
harmonisation of international accounting standards they assert that culturally 
related differences in accounting and auditing systems still persist. 148 They 
account this to the fact that accounting rests on principle-based judgments and 
decision-making. For example, although Korea has implemented accounting 
reforms that include aspects of international accounting standards and external 
auditor requirements, the cultural environment of accounting still remains 
substantially unchanged from the time prior to the reforms. Cultural 
characteristics favouring accounting flexibility and secrecy persist despite the 
efforts to enhance transparency and accountability in accordance with Western 
concepts of good governance. 149 In some instances reforms have been 
implemented according to the letter of the law but against its intention. This is the 
experience in Korea where firms reacted to the law reforms by staffing the 
mandatory audit committees with people close to or affiliated with the chaebol 
controlling families rather than with wholly independent persons. 150 
Some legislative reforms are purposely implemented to engender 
confidence from the market and investors. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 
("SOA'') was enacted, following the Enron corporate collapse, as a political 
reaction to give assurance to the public that the corporate governance failures 
were remedied by a tangible legal mechanism. 151 The collapse exposed massive 
profit manipulation, deceptive accounting and lackadaisical audit practices. 152 
The SOA prescribes financial reporting requirements, assumes jurisdiction over 
accountants and requires lawyers to disclosure fraud up the chain of comment 
command. It is a mechanism to foster a change from the CEO-centric culture of 
146 Licht, above n 75 , 6. 
147 Licht, above n 75 , 6. 
148 Licht, above n 75 , 50. 
149 Licht, above n 75, 53; see also Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz, above n 6, 28. 150 Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz, above n 6, 28. 151 
James A Brickley, Clifford W Smith (Junior) and Gerald L Zimmerman "Corporate 
Governance, Ethics and Organisational Architecture" in Chew, Donald H (Junior) and Stuart L 
Gillan (eds) Corporate Governance at the Cross Roads (McGraw-Hill frwin, New York, 2005) 104. 
152 Diplock, above n 12. 
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United States corporations to a culture of accountability with the ultimate goal of 
corporate performance and increased shareholder value.
153 
The financial accountability of the Wananga is a relevant local example 
of the differing effect that cultural characteristics have on how accountability 
requirements manifest as a result of the differing ownership and control 
arrangements in Maori and iwi organisations. In early 2005, the Wananga was on 
the verge of insolvency and required a $20 million Government loan to prevent 
financial collapse. The loan received intense criticism from the media, the New 
Zealand public and opposition parties based on the perception that the Wananga 
lacked appropriate financial management and accountability mechanisms 
sufficient to account for the $239 million in tax payer funding it had received.
154 
In the author's opinion, this highlights the differing external controls to which 
Maori and iwi organisations are subject to by their shareholders or stakeholders. 
Some Maori organisations (as in the case of the Wananga) do not have members 
that could be seen as analogous to shareholders or beneficiaries. Without this 
active shareholder or owner participation, organisations lack the rigor of external 
control that iwi organisations have. 
In contrast, iwi organisations are more accountable because their 
members have a vested interest in actively enforcing accountability mechanisms. 
Notably, iwi organisations subject to the MF A, owe particular ri.ghts to their 
members which may be enforced before the Maori Land Court, as the court of 
first instance. Furthermore, members' rights manifest as an interest or benefit that 
is not tradeable. This is in contrast to the full complement of rights afforded in an 
Anglo-Saxon shareholder governance model. In addition, the iwi organisation 
takes a fiduciary type role in respect of the assets, 
155 which are also often 
regarded by members as collective assets. 156 For example, TRAION is a common 
law trust that holds assets on behalf of the members of the iwi of Ngapuhi. The 
fiduciary relationship between TRAION and members of the Ngapuhi iwi is 
typical of iwi organisations. The relationship between iwi member and iwi 
153 R William Ide "Post-Enron Corporate Governance Opportunities: Creating a Culture of Greater 
Board Collaboration and Oversight" (2003) 54 Mercer L Rev 829. 
154 M Tait "$20 million loan to save Wananga" (9 May 2005) The New Zealand Herald, Auckland 
<http://www.nzherald.co.nz> (last accessed 5 September 2005). 
155 Maori Fisheries Act 2004, s l2(1)(a). 
156 Coxhead and Royal, above n 59. 
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organisation carries with it the possibility of litigation as well as other statutory 
accountability mechanisms. Maori organisations are therefore subject to less 
stringent accountability regulation than iwi organisations. 
These examples illustrate that both the cultural characteristics of the asset 
as well as the governance and ownership arrangements determine the extent to 
which the organisation will be held accountable by its members or owners. 
2. Enforcement of rights 
Cultural influences affect the decision-making processes that determine 
whether any matter will be enforced (for example, by litigation) or resolved 
through other means. Studies have indicated that the effect of cultural values 
continues to be important in affecting the degree to w_hich Western corporate 
insolvency ideas are applied by creditors in debt enforcement. 157 Other 
international research also suggests that culture and ideology can explain the 
failure in many countries to create efficient laws that achieve adequate levels of 
enforcement. 158 
In China there has historically been a view that insolvency laws are 
unnecessary. 
159 
Companies and individuals favoured the resolution of issues 
without resort to the law or litigation. 160 This outwork was driven by the primacy 
afforded to the importance placed on maintaining relationships and an aversion to 
, 1 · 16 I pursumg persona mterests. The cultural value placed on self-reliance also 
encouraged people to use their own means to deal with issues rather than the legal 
system, which was perceived as irrelevant to their social values. The persistence 
of the Confucian value system has therefore guided dispute resolution in China 
towards amicable, rather than the adversarial, resolution of issues. Accordingly, 
greater leniency is shown towards an insolvent investor in China, than in Europe 
or the United States.
162 
Similarly, in Indonesia the ethnic and religious diversity 
157 
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has lead to the use of negotiation and compromise as a way of handling 
insolvency problems. 163 
Taiwan's insolvency law and practice is also influenced by models and 
values similar to those in China. 
164 Literature establishes that local customs still 
play an important part in relation to the handling of corporate debt in Taiwan. 
165 
The import of custom (culture) was even noted by the committee drafting the new 
insolvency law reforms. In an attempt to codify cultural preference towards 
informal dispute resolution a provision was introduced that allows the debtor to 
apply to the courts or the Chamber of Commerce for an amicable settlement prior 
to the instigation of formal bankruptcy proceedings. This is an apparent melding 
of the Confucian preference for alternative dispute resolution processes (ie settling 
disputes through reliance upon personal relationships rather than law) and 
Western insolvency law administration. It is a clear example of how culture can 
impact on the development and implementation of law. Such a culturally atturied 
legal transplant is more likely to be successfully implemented than laws that are 
inconsistent with the values of that culture. 
This preference for resolving disputes usmg alternative methods is 
demonstrated in the example of Ngati Kahungunu ki Wairarapa Maori Executive 
Taiwhenua Iwi Authority Incorporated ("Authority"), the representative 
organisation of Wairarapa-based Ngati Kahungunu. In 2001 the Authority 
became insolvent with debts of approximately $500,000. The Authority 
negotiated with creditors to reach a compromise pursuant to the Incorporated 
Societies Act 1906. The deal also ensured that creditors did not make claims 
against either the assets of the Authority's health service or against any fisheries 
settlements assets. 166 This is an example of where cultural preference for dispute 
resolution produced a more culturally acceptable outcome (through the protection 
of Treaty settlement assets) outcome than an adversarial process would have. 
The MF A allows for the implementation of culturally attuned and 
informed dispute resolution processes within a legislative framework. Kaupapa 8 
163 Tomasic et al , above n 157, 284. 
164 Tomasic et al , above n 157, 257. 
165 Tomasic et al , above n 157, 278 . 
166 NZPA "Offer to Creditors from Iwi Authority" (18 August 2001) The Dominion, Wellington 9 
<http: //io .knowledge-basket.co.nz> (last accessed l September 2005). 
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of Schedule 7 of the MF A sets out the requirement for a dispute resolution 
procedure to deal with disputes between members and the entity. TOKM 
considers that dispute resolution mechanisms are essential to the successful 
implementation of the allocation model and the overarching obligation that the 
settlement is ultimately for the benefit of all Maori. 167 Under the MF A, iwi 
organisations who are subject to the MF A must expressly set out a method for 
resolving intra tribal disputes; the clear preference being resolution of disputes in 
a form other than by recourse to the courts. 168 The MF A therefore prescribes a 
regime that favours alternative dispute resolution over adversarial processes. 
The MF A allows iwi organisations to create dispute resolution processes 
that are culturally relevant for adoption in the constitutional documents of the iwi 
organisations. 169 Part 5 of the MF A prescribes a four-step process for the 
resolution of disputes under the MF A. This includes the requirement that 
disputing parties attempt, in the first instance, to resolve the dispute. 170 Other 
options include the referral of the dispute to TOKMTL for determinatism, 171 and 
referral of the dispute to the Maori Land Court. 172 The statutory right to refer 
disputes to the Maori Land Court also provides the organisation and its members 
with a culturally attuned forum for determination of the issues as the Maori Land 
Court can utilise tikanga experts to provide culturally relevant dispute resolution 
procedures in respect of disputes referred to it under the MF A. 173 The Court has 
also been given broad powers to make a wide variety of orders in respect of 
disputes referred to it under the MF A. 174 This includes providing advice on 
disputes, 175 hearing, determining and making orders, 176 and requesting reports. 177 
In summary, the MF A dispute resolution models provide iwi with the ability to 
apply their own, distinct cultural values and understandings to the dispute 
167 Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission He Kawai Amokura - A Model for Allocation of the Fisheries Settlement Assets Report to the Minister of Fisheries (Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission, Wellington, 2003) 102. 168 Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission Dispute Resolution Procedures (Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission, Wellington, 1995). 169 Maori Fisheries Act 2004, 7 th Sch, kaupapa 10. 170 Maori Fisheries Act 2004,s 181 (I) . 
171 Maori Fisheries Act 2004,s 181 (2). 172 Maori Fisheries Act 2004,s 182. 173 Maori Fisheries Act 2004, ss 26E(4), 26F(4) and 26G(5). 174 Maori Fisheries Act 2004, s 182(2). 175 Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993, s 268. 176 Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993, s 26C. 177 Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993, s 26H. 
resolution process they choose to use and would also allow for organisations to 
utilise processes that are culturally distinct to their specific tribal group. 
In summary, culture influences accountability through the ways in which 
it incentivises members, shareholders and owners to enforce accountability 
mechanisms in respect of the organisation. Culture also influences the preference 
of what forum or form enforcement of rights will take. 
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IV WHAT DOES CULTURE DO TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE? -
LESSONS FOR NEW ZEALAND 
A Culture Does Matter 
The view that culture forms an important part of the development and 
implementation of corporate governance was contrary to the mainstream corporate 
governance thinking of the past decade. Until recently, corporate governance was 
seen as a product of governance drivers as shaped by Anglo-Saxon (specifically 
United States) governance needs and jurisprudence. 178 Not surprisingly, until 
recently corporate governance literature largely ignored the role of culture in 
corporate governance. Some writers acknowledge that as a result of this lack of 
focus there is a lacuna in comparative corporate governance literature on culture, 
and that the effects of culture ambiguous. 179 However, as illustrated in this paper, 
recent research has established that culture is a fundamentally important element 
in corporate governance systems and processes. That said, culture is not the only 
pre-requisite for good corporate governance, and does not in itself guarantee 
effectiveness of corporate governance systems. 180 As seen in the example of 
Brazil, cultural influence can actually impede the imposition of strategies that 
would make governance more effective, according to Anglo-Saxon corporate 
governance standards. 
Culture has been shown to affect how laws are perceived, complied with 
and implemented. Culture is therefore of vital import to both the development of 
governance structures and in the practical implementation of governance 
processes. The question of whether cultural characteristics will be manifested in a 
cultural overlay or entrenched in the corporate governance legal institutions (ie 
whether culture has structural or procedural influence) was raised in Part II D. 
The analysis undertaken in Part III supports a 'half-way house' response. As seen 
in both international and local examples, cultural characteristics are incorporated 
within legislation as well as being a norm that operates outside of the legal 
institutions to influence behaviour and actions in a corporate governance context. 
178 Licht, above n 7. 
179 Licht, above n 7, 25. 
180 Whitehead and Annesley, above n 14; Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz, above n 6. 
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Because cultural values and beliefs are embedded in both social and legal 
institutions/ 81 the extent to which corporate governance systems are compatible 
with the entrenched cultural characteristics determines what particular corporate 
structures and governance rules are implemented, as well as how they are 
implemented. This is because underlying social attitudes ( cultural values and 
beliefs) are reflected in the expression of the law and in the informal norms that 
are inherent in and determine that expression. 
182 Therefore, acknowledging 
culture and ideology as a central feature of corporate governance assists in the 
analysis of why differing nations have different patterns and expressions of 
corporate governance. 
It has also been shown that culture can benefit corporate governance 
systems and processes. It does this by facilitating culturally compatible 
governance. This was observed most clearly in the Korean studies, where Korea 
has developed its own version of corporate governance that is based on an 
amalgam of imported legal elements and local cultural characteristics and 
practices.183 This supports the assertion in this paper that corporate governance 
systems are developed for their own cultural circumstances. 
However, some commentators caution against widespread uptake of 
cultural considerations in corporate governance. They argue that such a focus 
runs the risk of caricaturing nations or relying on myths or stereotypes.
184 
However, in the author's opinion, this argument appears to rely on the assumption 
that the expression of culture is static. If this is the case then the expression of 
culture will be captured in legislation to the detriment of the development of 
culturally attuned legal systems. Entrenchment of the expression of culture, rather 
than the core values that underpin the relevant culture, will result in legislation 
that becomes quickly outdated and flawed. 
185 Such legislation would cease to 
reflect an appropriate cultural match and therefore reduce the legitimacy that the 
organisations enjoys from those it governs. In contrast, culture, like the social 
181 Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz, above n 6. 
182 H Patrick Glenn l egal Traditions of the World (Oxford University Press, Oxford, United 
Kingdom). 
183 Licht, above n 75. 
184 Licht, above n 7. 
185 For example, the Maori Trust Boards Act 1955 which prescribes the expression of cultural 
values, and has been widely criticised as paternalistic and outdated. Whilst the scope of this paper 
does not allow a full analysis of this issue, I note it for completeness. 
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forces that inform and shape it, changes and develops in response to differing 
pressures, both internal and external, although the outward expression of culture 
or the way in which it influences governance ( or other legal) systems may vary 
with time and circumstance. The fundamental metaphysical assumptions that 
form the basis of the cultural values remain consistent. 186 Therefore, where 
cultural characteristics are to be provided for in legislation or legal frameworks, it 
is imperative that it is the core (metaphysical) values that are represented. It is 
these that are important for the continued expression of those values m a 
culturally consistent and legitimate manner. The MF A illustrates this approach. 
It is an example of the successful legislative incorporation of cultural 
characteristics within the corporate governance systems and processes of iwi 
organisations. 
B Lessons for New Zealand 
In the context of Maori and iwi organisations, recent literature 
acknowledges the integral role culture plays in governance efficacy. However, 
how culture ( and in particular the specific principles and values of Maori culture) 
impacts on the corporate governance of Maori and iwi organisations is a relatively 
green fields area. Implementing the philosophies of accountability, transparency 
and stewardship in Maori and iwi organisations faces unique challenges because 
of the influence that Maori cultural factors play in the implementation and 
development of the governance processes and systems of the organisations. 187 
The MF A is an interesting statutory creature as it will change the face of 
iwi politics and governance. The MF A provides for the expression of distinctly 
Maori cultural characteristics in the exercise of corporate governance. However, 
because of its foundation in Anglo-Saxon governance models, the MF A, in the 
author's opinion, will over time ensure that the governance of iwi organisations 
will align with Anglo-Saxon (western) notions of participation and control. As 
seen in the example of Japan, such legal reform will change how cultural 
characteristics are expressed in corporate governance. This change may result in 
the westernisation of previously culturally determined expressions of corporate 
186 Per Witherspoon in Mead, above n 26, 351. 
187 Coxhead and Royal , above n 59. 
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governance. This is because incorporation of cultural characteristics and values 
within legislation will alter the expression of those characteristics in line with the 
legal framework into which it is placed. Such incorporation will facilitate the 
expression of those cultural characteristics as well as standardise their expression. 
In the attempt to enable the cultural characteristics or values to be upheld, the 
effect could in fact be to permanently alter them. This reinforces the assertion 
made above that it is important that the values, rather than the expression of the 
values, be represented. Accordingly, because the MFA is a relatively new piece 
of legislation, time will tell what impact the it will have on the expression of and 
perhaps even the transformation of Maori cultural values, beliefs and practices as 
they are expressed in corporate governance. 
The above analysis focuses on the transplantation of cultural 
characteristics into an Anglo-Saxon legal framework and assumes that the 
corporate governance of Maori, iwi, or other non-Western organisations must 
necessarily be measured against its conformity to Anglo-Saxon corporate 
governance ideologies. However, there is an alternative position, where the 
analysis is shifted in favour of reference to a tikanga or kaupapa Maori 
framework. Maori and iwi organisations could be measured against tikanga or 
kaupapa. 188 Such an analysis may provide greater insights into the drivers behind 
cultural characteristics in corporate governance. In this way, instead of a focus on 
how culture negatively impacts upon Western 'good corporate governance', the 
viewpoint could be how cultural characteristics enhance these systems and 
processes. 189 The focus is instead on Maori concepts of good governance rather 
than using Anglo-Saxon corporate governance models to reduce the influence of 
or measure those factors. 
190 Royal (2005) anticipates that Maori and iwi 
organisations will eventually start to set out their own kaupapa Maori good 
governance processes. Coxhead (2005) considers that quadruple bottom line 
reporting and accounting will also result in changes in the perception of what 
good governance means for Maori and iwi organisations. 
188 Coxhead and Royal, above n 59. 
189 Per James Johnston in Story, above n 58. 
19° Coxhead and Royal, above n 59. 
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Such processes allow substantial scope for the expression of cultural 
characteristics within the boundaries of and consistent with Anglo-Saxon good 
governance practices. In this way Maori and iwi organisations can set their own 
culturally attuned good governance processes and systems. This concept is 
consistent with that proposed by Licht et al (2004) who argue for the development 
of culturally compatible corporate governance. In the authors opinion, a 
potentially limitless opportunity exists for Maori and iwi organisations to achieve 
cultural match and culturally attuned governance if the kaupapa Maori 
measurements and focus, as suggested by Coxhead and Royal (2005), come to 
fruition. In applying Licht et al's (2004) analogy to the New Zealand context, this 
could result in 'good Maori governance' that is different from but equally as 
efficient and valid as 'Anglo-Saxon good governance' models. This more likely to 
result in more robust and efficient organisations than could perhaps be otherwise 
attained. 
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V CONCLUSION 
Culture affects how laws are developed, perceived, complied with and 
implemented. Specifically, corporate governance is shaped by both informal 
( cultural and social) as well as formal (legal) mechanisms. Culture can also be 
incorporated in the governance structures and processes of organisations through 
both informal (cultural overlay) and formal (culturally attuned legal frameworks) 
means. Culture is therefore a highly relevant and powerful factor influencing both 
the development and expression of corporate governance. 
The analysis undertaken in this paper demonstrates the differing ways in 
which culture is expressed and influences fundamental elements of Anglo-Saxon 
corporate governance. 
Culturally informed characteristics influence the ownership arrangements 
and expression of rights in organisations. This is particularly so for those iwi 
organisations subject to the MF A where collectively owned assets are held by one 
entity with enforceable participatory rights in respect of key governance decisions 
are held by iwi members. 
Cultural influences overlay the implementation of governance processes 
that regulate transparency mechanisms such as independence and disclosure and 
reporting. In order to account for this cultural influence, some organisations have 
implemented structural remedies such as advisory boards, restructuring, and 
internal or procedural mechanisms. The MF A has legislated to reduce cultural 
influence that results in undesirable outcomes in respect of transparency. 
Culture also influences accountability through the ways in which it 
incentivises members, shareholders and owners to enforce accountability 
mechanisms in respect of the organisation. Culture also influences the preference 
of what forum or form enforcement of rights will take. 
These findings also apply to the New Zealand corporate governance 
context. They have particular relevance for Maori and iwi organisations, for 
whom culture is significant for the implementation of culturally attuned corporate 
governance systems and processes. Maori cultural values (tikanga Maori) are 
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expressed in both the development and expression of corporate governance m 
Maori and iwi organisations. 
The MF A is an example of the successful legislative incorporation of 
cultural characteristics within the corporate governance systems and processes of 
iwi organisations. This will impact on the future governance of iwi organisations. 
Specifically, the entrenchment of cultural characteristics will change the way that 
these cultural characteristics are expressed in the corporate governance context. 
In the authors opinion, the incorporation of cultural characteristics into Anglo-
Saxon legal frameworks will result in a westernisation of the expression of those 
cultural characteristics. If the legal construct upon which the cultural 
characteristics are transplanted is inconsistent with the cultural values, then this 
may result in a disjunct between the two systems, rendering the cultural 
characteristics a liability rather than an asset. 
Such a disjunct could be mitigated by the use of the kaupapa Maori 
focus. Accordingly, Maori and iwi organisations should be able to set and 
measure their own culturally attuned governance processes and systems. This will 
result in 'good Maori governance' that is different from but equally as efficient and 
valid as 'Anglo-Saxon good governance' models. 
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APPENDIX 1 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2004 
ENSURING THE BASIS FOR AN EFFECTIVE CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK 
The corporate governance framework should promote transparent and 
efficient markets, be consistent with the rule of law and clearly 
articulate the division of responsibilities among different supervisory, 
regulatory and enforcement authorities. 
The corporate governance framework should be developed with a view to 
its impact on overall economic performance, market integrity and the 
incentives it creates for market participants and the promotion of 
transparent and efficient markets . 
B. The legal and regulatory requirements that affect corporate governance 
practices in a jurisdiction should be consistent with the rule of law, 
transparent and enforceable. 
C. The division of responsibilities among different authorities in a 
jurisdiction should be clearly articulated and ensure that the public 
interest is served. 
D. Supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities should have the 
authority, integrity and resources to fulfil their duties in a professional 
and objective manner. Moreover, their rulings should be timely, 
transparent and fully explained. 
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II THE RIGHTS OF SHAREHOLDERS AND KEY OWNERSHIP 
FUNCTIONS 
The corporate governance framework should protect and facilitate the 
exercise of shareholders' rights. 
A. Basic shareholder rights should include the right to: 
1. secure methods of ownership registration; 
2. convey or transfer shares; 
3. obtain relevant and material information on the corporation on a 
timely and regular basis; 
4. participate and vote in general shareholder meetings; 
5. elect and remove members of the board; and 
6. share in the profits of the corporation. 
B. Shareholders should have the right to participate in, and to be sufficiently 
informed on, decisions concerning fundamental corporate changes such 
as: 
1. amendments to the statutes, or articles of incorporation or 
similar governing documents of the company; 
2. the authorisation of additional shares; and 
3. extraordinary transactions, including the transfer of all or 
substantially all assets, that in effect result in the sale of the 
company. 
C. Shareholders should have the opportunity to participate effectively and 
vote in general shareholder meetings and should be informed of the rules, 
including voting procedures, that govern general shareholder meetings: 
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1. Shareholders should be furnished with sufficient and timely 
information concerning the date, location and agenda of general 
meetings, as well as full and timely information regarding the 
issues to be decided at the meeting. 
2. Shareholders should have the opportunity to ask questions to the 
board, including questions relating to the annual external audit, 
to place items on the agenda of general meetings, and to propose 
resolutions, subject to reasonable limitations. 
3. Effective shareholder participation in key corporate governance 
decisions, such as the nomination and election of board 
members, should be facilitated. Shareholders should be able to 
make their views known on the remuneration policy for board 
members and key executives. The equity component of 
compensation schemes for board members and employees 
should be subject to shareholder approval. 
4. Shareholders should be able to vote in person or in absentia, and 
equal effect should be given to votes whether cast in person or 
in absentia. 
D. Capital structures and arrangements that enable certain shareholders to 
obtain a degree of control disproportionate to their equity ownership 
should be disclosed. 
E. Markets for corporate control should be allowed to function m an 
efficient and transparent manner. 
1. The rules and procedures governing the acquisition of corporate 
control in the capital markets, and extraordinary transactions 
such as mergers, and sales of substantial portions of corporate 
assets, should be clearly articulated and disclosed so that 
investors understand their rights and recourse. Transactions 
should occur at transparent prices and under fair conditions that 
protect the rights of all shareholders according to their class. 
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2. Anti-take-over devices should not be used to shield management 
and the board from accountability. 
F. The exercise of ownership rights by all shareholders, including 
institutional investors, should be facilitated. 
1. Institutional investors acting in a fiduciary capacity should 
disclose their overall corporate governance and voting policies 
with respect to their investments, including the procedures that 
they have in place for deciding on the use of their voting rights. 
2. Institutional investors acting in a fiduciary capacity should 
disclose how they manage material conflicts of interest that may 
affect the exercise of key ownership rights regarding their 
investments. 
G. Shareholders, including institutional shareholders, should be allowed to 
consult with each other on issues concerning their basic shareholder 
rights as defined in the Principles, subject to exceptions to prevent abuse. 
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III THE EQUITABLE TREATMENT OF SHAREHOLDERS 
The corporate governance framework should ensure the equitable 
treatment of all shareholders, including minority and foreign 
shareholders. All shareholders should have the opportunity to obtain 
effective redress for violation of their rights. 
A. All shareholders of the same series of a class should be treated equally. 
1. Within any series of a class, all shares should carry the same 
rights. All investors should be able to obtain information about 
the rights attached to all series and classes of shares before they 
purchase. Any changes in voting rights should be subject to 
approval by those classes of shares which are negatively 
affected. 
2. Minority shareholders should be protected from abusive actions 
by, or in the interest of, controlling shareholders acting either 
directly or indirectly, and should have effective means of 
redress. 
3. Votes should be cast by custodians or nominees in a manner 
agreed upon with the beneficial owner of the shares. 
4. Impediments to cross border voting should be eliminated. 
5. Processes and procedures for general shareholder meetings 
should allow for equitable treatment of all shareholders. 
Company procedures should not make it unduly difficult or 
expensive to cast votes. 
B. Insider trading and abusive self dealing should be prohibited. 
C. Members of the board and key executives should be required to disclose 
to the board whether they, directly, indirectly or on behalf of third 
parties, have a material interest in any transaction or matter directly 
affecting the corporation. 
IV THE ROLE OF STAKEHOLDERS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The corporate governance framework should recognise the rights of 
stakeholders established by law or through mutual agreements and 
encourage active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders 
in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound 
enterprises. 
A. The rights of stakeholders that are established by law or through mutual 
agreements are to be respected. 
B. Where stakeholder interests are protected by law, stakeholders should 
have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their 
rights. 
C. Performance-enhancing mechanisms for employee participation should 
be permitted to develop. 
D. Where stakeholders participate in the corporate governance process, they 
should have access to relevant, sufficient and reliable information on a 
timely and regular basis. 
E. Stakeholders, including individual employees and their representative 
bodies, should be able to freely communicate their concerns about illegal 
or unethical practices to the board and their rights should not be 
compromised for doing this. 
F. The corporate governance framework should be complemented by an 
effective, efficient insolvency framework and by effective enforcement 
of creditor rights. 
V DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY 
The corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and 
accurate disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the 
corporation, including the financial situation, performance, ownership, 
and governance of the company. 
A. Disclosure should include, but not be limited to, material information on: 
1. The financial and operating results of the company. 
2. Company objectives. 
3. Major share ownership and voting rights. 
4. Remuneration policy for members of the board and key 
executives, and information about board members, including 
their qualifications, the selection process, other company 
directorships and whether they are regarded as independent by 
the board. 
5. Related party transactions. 
6. Foreseeable risk factors. 
7. Issues regarding employees and other stakeholders. 
8. Governance structures and policies, in particular, the content of 
any corporate governance code or policy and the process by 
which it is implemented. 
B. Information should be prepared and disclosed in accordance with high 
quality standards of accounting and financial and non-financial 
disclosure. 
C. An annual audit should be conducted by an independent, competent and 
qualified, auditor in order to provide an external and objective assurance 
to the board and shareholders that the financial statements fairly 
represent the financial position and performance of the company in all 
material respects. 
D. External auditors should be accountable to the shareholders and owe a 
duty to the company to exercise due professional care in the conduct of 
the audit. 
E. Channels for disseminating information should provide for equal, timely 
and cost efficient access to relevant information by users. 
F. The corporate governance framework should be complemented by an 
effective approach that addresses and promotes the provision of analysis 
or advice by analysts, brokers, rating agencies and others, that is relevant 
to decisions by investors, free from material. conflicts of interest that 
might compromise the integrity of their analysis or advice. 
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VI THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE BOARD 
The corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic 
guidance of the company, the effective monitoring of management by 
the board, and the board's accountability to the company and the 
shareholders. 
A. Board members should act on a fully informed basis, in good faith, with 
due diligence and care, and in the best interest of the company and the 
shareholders. 
B. Where board decisions may affect different shareholder groups 
differently, the board should treat all shareholders fairly. 
C. The board should apply high ethical standards. It should take into 
account the interests of stakeholders. 
D. The board should fulfil certain key functions, including: 
1. Reviewing and guiding corporate strategy, maJor plans of 
action, risk policy, annual budgets and business plans; setting 
performance objectives; monitoring implementation and 
corporate performance; and overseemg maJor capital 
expenditures, acquisitions and divestitures. 
2. Monitoring the effectiveness of the company's governance 
practices and making changes as needed. 
3. Selecting, compensating, monitoring and, when necessary, 
replacing key executives and overseeing succession planning. 
4. Aligning key executive and board remuneration with the longer 
term interests of the company and its shareholders. 
5. Ensuring a formal and transparent board nomination and 
election process. 
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6. Monitoring and managmg potential conflicts of interest of 
management, board members and shareholders, including 
misuse of corporate assets and abuse in related party 
transactions. 
7. Ensuring the integrity of the corporation's accounting and 
financial reporting systems, including the independent audit, and 
that appropriate systems of control are in place, in particular, 
systems for risk management, financial and operational control, 
and compliance with the law and relevant standards. 
8. Overseeing the process of disclosure and communications. 
E. The board should be able to exercise objective independent judgement on 
corporate affairs. 
1. Boards should consider assigning a sufficient number of non-
executive board members capable of exercising independent 
judgement to tasks where there is a potential for conflict of 
interest. Examples of such key responsibilities are ensuring the 
integrity of financial and non-financial reporting, the review of 
related party transactions, nomination of board members and 
key executives, and board remuneration. 
2. When committees of the board are established, their mandate, 
composition and working procedures should be well defined and 
disclosed by the board. 
3. Board members should be able to commit themselves effectively 
to their responsibilities. 
F. In order to fulfil their responsibilities, board members should have access 
to accurate, relevant and timely information. 
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